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 ALTERNATIVES TO A CONSTITUTIONAL 
AMENDMENT: HOW CONGRESS MAY 
PROVIDE FOR THE QUICK, TEMPORARY 
FILLING OF HOUSE MEMBER SEATS IN 
EMERGENCIES BY STATUTE 
Paul Taylor* 
INTRODUCTION 
Recently, some have argued that a constitutional amendment 
is necessary to provide for the temporary appointment of House 
members to fill seats left vacant by terrorist attacks directed at 
Congress and resulting in large numbers of casualties. Norman 
Ornstein of the American Enterprise Institute, for example, has 
written that “[i]f a large number of House members were 
disabled and/or killed, the Constitution limits replacement to 
special elections . . . . As a general rule, I oppose constitutional 
amendments. But there is no other way to confront this 
problem.”1 Such an amendment, H.J. Res. 67, introduced in the 
107th Congress, would authorize governors to appoint persons to 
take the place temporarily of members who had died or become 
incapacitated when 25% or more of all House members were 
                                                          
 * The author is counsel to the House Subcommittee on the Constitution. 
He is a graduate of Yale College, summa cum laude, and of the Harvard Law 
School, cum laude. The conclusions and opinions expressed in the article are 
exclusively those of the author, and do not represent any official or unofficial 
position of the House Committee on the Judiciary, any of its subcommittees, 
or any of its members. 
1 Norman Ornstein, Worst Case Scenarios Demand the House’s 
Immediate Attention, ROLL CALL, Nov. 8, 2001, at 8. 
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unable to perform their duties.2 However, this article explores the 
bases for congressional authority, by statute, to provide for the 
quick, temporary filling of House member seats in emergencies. 
As the Congressional Research Service has pointed out,3 H.J. 
Res. 67 is not the first proposed amendment of its kind to have 
been introduced. From the 1940s through 1962, the issue of 
filling House vacancies in the event of a national emergency 
generated considerable interest among some members of 
Congress during the “Cold War” with the Soviet Union. More 
than thirty proposed constitutional amendments that provided for 
temporarily filling House vacancies or selecting successors in 
case of the disability of a significant number of representatives 
were introduced from the 79th through the 87th Congress.4 The 
House has never voted on any of these proposals.5 
                                                          
2 See H.J. Res. 67, § 1. 
3 See Sula P. Richardson, House Vacancies: Selected Proposals to Allow 
for Filling Them Due to National Emergencies, Cong. Res. Serv. (CRS), at 3 
n.5 (Dec. 3, 2001). 
4 The proposals are as follow: H.J. Res. 362, 79th Cong. (1945-1947); 
H.J. Res. 34, S.J. Res. 161, 80th Cong. (1947-1949); H.J. Res. 48, 81st 
Cong. (1949-1951); H.J. Res. 155, 166, S.J. Res. 59, 75, 82d Cong. (1951-
1953); H.J. Res. 135, 159, 244, 507, S.J. Res. 39, 150, 83d Cong. (1953-
1955); H.J. Res. 50, 295, 322, 325, 475, S.J. Res. 8, 84th Cong. (1955-
1957); H.J. Res. 52, 105, S.J. Res. 157, 85th Cong. (1957-1959); H.J. Res. 
30, 519, S.J. Res. 85, 86th Cong. (1959-1961); H.J. Res. 29, 74, 91, 508, 
893, S.J. Res. 123, 87th Cong. (1961-1963). 
5 Many of the current issues raised and policy arguments offered in 
support of or in opposition to the temporary appointment of representatives are 
the same as those that were made fifty years ago. See 100 CONG. REC. 7660 
(1954) (remarks of Senator Knowland).  
The proposed amendment is a form of insurance which, of course, we 
hope will never have to be used, but, in view of the fact that we are 
on notice, at least, that it would be conceivably possible to eliminate 
the House of Representatives . . . by a single attack on the Nation’s 
Capital, I believe that we can no longer, as prudent citizens and as 
prudent Members of the House and the Senate, ignore that possibility. 
Id. See also APPOINTMENT OF REPRESENTATIVES IN TIME OF NATIONAL 
EMERGENCY, S. REP. NO. 1459, at 3 (1954) (“Acts of violence may 
encompass attacks by atomic or hydrogen weapons, germ warfare, or even 
wholesale assassination of Members of the House by less spectacular 
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H.J. Res. 67 and similar proposals are based implicitly on the 
understanding that the Constitution does not provide a mechanism 
for the temporary appointment of House members following 
vacancies. This understanding is based on the Seventeenth 
Amendment to the Constitution, which provides for the popular 
election of senators and the filling of Senate seat vacancies 
through gubernatorial appointments,6 and the fact that there is no 
similar provision in the Constitution explicitly authorizing states 
to provide for temporary appointments of House members. 
Alternatively, this article explores the bases for congressional 
authority, by statute, to provide for the quick, temporary filling 
of House member seats in emergencies. By providing for the 
temporary filling of vacant House seats by statute, rather than by 
constitutional amendment, Congress could more flexibly adapt to 
particular emergency situations and avoid the lengthy amendment 
process. Neither the intent behind the Seventeenth Amendment, 
nor the Constitution’s voting rights provisions, prohibit 
Congress’ exercise of its authority under Article I, section 4, 
Clause 1 to provide for the temporary filling of vacant House 
seats either through elections by a limited electorate or possibly 
by appointment. 
                                                          
weapons.”). 
 The events of September 11, 2001, have raised additional issues. Suicidal 
terrorists may act independently from sovereign nations and may not be 
deterred from using weapons of mass destruction because of the possible 
consequences for their own people. On the other hand, the situation in the 
1950s may have been even more dire than today because a nuclear attack was 
expected to occur, if at all, with overwhelming force that would have 
destroyed much if not most of the American land mass. See 100 CONG. REC. 
7661 (1954) (remarks of Senator Knowland) (“[I]n the event of an atomic 
attack . . . we may assume, at least for purposes of our discussion, that in the 
various States of the Union . . . there would be a simultaneous enemy attack. 
It might be very difficult even to hold elections within a period of 60 days.”). 
6 U.S. CONST. amend. XVII. 
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I. THE SEVENTEENTH AMENDMENT AND CONGRESS’ 
AUTHORITY TO MAKE REGULATIONS GOVERNING THE TIME, 
PLACES AND MANNER OF HOLDING FEDERAL ELECTIONS 
Prior to adoption of the Seventeenth Amendment, Article I, 
Section 3, of the Constitution provided that senators would be 
chosen by state legislatures. Because state legislatures were often 
in session for only small portions of the year, Article I, Section 
3, provided that “during the Recess of the Legislature of any 
State, the executive thereof may make temporary Appointments 
until the next Meeting of the Legislature, which shall then fill 
such vacancies.”7 Debates on the Seventeenth Amendment do not 
indicate that the amendment was intended to do anything other 
than provide for the popular election of senators, with the 
temporary appointment language of Article I, Section 3 simply 
carrying over into the Seventeenth Amendment.8 
                                                          
7 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3; see also THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED 
STATES AND THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 2-3 (U.S. Gov’t Printing 
Office 2000). 
8 The congressional debates over the Seventeenth Amendment also lend 
some support to the view that, at least in the minds of those addressing the 
question during such congressional debates, Congress already had the 
authority to enact a law authorizing the temporary filling of vacant House seats 
in the event of an emergency. 
 The Senate initially proposed and passed the Seventeenth Amendment that 
is part of our Constitution today. That amendment provides as follows: 
The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators 
from each State, elected by the people thereof, for six years; and each 
Senator shall have one vote. The electors in each State shall have the 
qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of 
the State legislatures. When vacancies happen in the representation of 
any State in the Senate, the executive authority of such State shall 
issue writs of election to fill such vacancies: Provided, That the 
legislature of any State may empower the executive thereof to make 
temporary appointments until the people fill the vacancies by election 
as the legislature may direct. 
U.S. CONST. amend. XVII. 
 When the House considered its version of the Seventeenth Amendment, it 
considered a proposed amendment that denied Congress its existing 
constitutional authority under Article I, Section 4 of the Constitution “to alter” 
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state laws governing the election of senators. The relevant portion of H.J. Res. 
39 that the House considered stated that “[t]he times, places, and manner of 
holding elections for Senators shall be as prescribed in each State by the 
Legislature thereof.” See 47 CONG. REC. 203 (1991). This amendment would 
have given state legislatures the exclusive authority to make laws governing 
the election of senators. Many congressmen opposed the change on the 
grounds that it denied Congress the ability to guarantee that senators would be 
sent to Congress in “emergency” situations. See 47 CONG. REC. 233 (1911) 
(remarks of Mr. Saunders). Those who opposed such a change stressed the 
importance of Congress’ ability to preserve itself in the event of unpredictable 
future events. Congressman Cannon stated the following:  
 I will not vote for such an amendment . . . . The Federal Government 
of the United States, a Government of limited power, supreme where 
power is granted under the Constitution, should always have the 
power to perpetuate itself without regard to what any States may do in 
failing to perform their duty.  
47 CONG. REC. 213 (1911) (remarks of Mr. Cannon). Congressman Nye 
asked, “Can we afford to divest Congress of a constitutional power which in 
its very nature is essential to the preservation of the Nation? What 
emergencies may arise in the future we can not tell, nor in what State or 
section nor at what time.” 47 CONG. REC. 230 (1911) (remarks of Mr. Nye). 
Congressman Lafferty stated, “[I]n the very nature of things it shocks the 
conscience or the intelligence of a lawyer . . . that Congress should surrender 
the power of providing for its own perpetuity.” 47 CONG. REC. 227 (1911) 
(remarks of Mr. Lafferty). Congressman Saunders stated, “It has been 
suggested that this language [in the original Constitution giving Congress the 
power ‘to alter’ elections laws enacted by state legislatures] was inserted to 
enable the Congress of the United States . . . to preserve itself in time of 
emergency.” 47 CONG. REC. 233 (1911) (remarks of Mr. Saunders). 
Congressman Miller stated the following:  
 It seems to me . . . that one great branch of Government [the Senate] 
is hereby surrendering its power to perpetuate and maintain 
itself . . . . By refusing to elect at all, [state legislatures could create a 
situation in which] the legislative arm of the Federal Government 
would be paralyzed. Many men now live who witnessed almost one-
half of the States withdraw from the Union and refuse to send 
Members to Congress. That which happened once may happen 
again . . . .  
47 CONG. REC. 219 (1911) (remarks of Mr. Miller). These comments 
regarding the possibility that states may secede in the future and fail to conduct 
elections of senators and congressmen implies that Congress has the authority 
to enact laws providing for the temporary filling of vacant House seats when it 
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In other words, the history of the adoption of the Seventeenth 
Amendment does not indicate that Congress, in allowing for 
states to provide for temporary appointment of senators, intended 
to deny a similar mechanism to Congress—under its authority 
granted in other provisions of the Constitution—to fill 
temporarily vacant House seats. Indeed, Article I, Section 4, 
Clause 1 of the Constitution may provide such a mechanism.9 
That provision states that “The Times, Places and Manner of 
holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be 
prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the 
Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such 
Regulations . . . .”10 Under this provision, Congress might, by 
statute, provide for the temporary filling of vacant House seats 
by either authorizing states to provide for temporary 
appointments of House members, by authorizing elections of 
House members by a restricted electorate, or by providing itself 
with such authority in the legislation. Congress could pass such 
legislation following the need to fill vacancies, even if there were 
only three surviving House members.11 Each of those situations 
                                                          
proves impossible or difficult to conduct prompt general elections in a 
particular state. 
 In any case, the House ultimately voted to accept the original Senate-
passed version of the Seventeenth Amendment and to reject a provision taking 
away Congress’ authority “to alter” state election laws in cases of 
“emergency.” See 47 CONG. REC. 233 (1911) (remarks of Mr. Saunders). 
While the House, on April 13, 1911, passed a version of the Seventeenth 
Amendment that included an additional clause denying Congress its existing 
constitutional authority to alter state laws governing the election of senators, 
on April 23, 1911, the Senate voted to insist on its version of the Seventeenth 
Amendment, which did not contain such a provision, and on May 13, 1911, 
the House passed the Senate’s version of the Seventeenth Amendment, which 
is now part of our Constitution. See U.S. Const. Amend. XVII. 
9 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1. 
10 Id. (emphasis added). 
11 Article 1, Section 5 provides that “a Majority of each [House] shall 
constitute a Quorum to do Business,” and that provision has been interpreted 
by Congress to mean a majority of members who have been duly sworn, 
chosen, and living. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5; House Manual, § 53 (“So the 
decision of the House now is that after the House is once organized the 
quorum consists of a majority of those members chosen, sworn, and living 
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would still constitute a quorum under House rules, after which 
the Senate could then pass the legislation. Further, if Congress 
acted after any such tragedy, it would be able to assess the actual 
emergency at hand instead of attempting to predict the contours 
of an imagined future emergency.12 
                                                          
whose membership has not been terminated by resignation, or by the action of 
the House.”). Congress is authorized to interpret the rules governing its own 
proceedings by Article I, Section 5 of the Constitution, which provides that 
“Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings . . . .” This would 
be so even if massive vacancies occurred before a new House in a new 
Congress had adopted its rules for the session. One of the first items of 
business the House addresses in each new Congress is the adoption of rules 
that will govern its proceedings during that Congress. Until the new rules are 
adopted, the House operates under “general parliamentary procedure,” which 
allows a simple majority vote to decide an issue or close debate. See 107 
CONG. REC. 239 (1961). Under the general parliamentary law that governs 
before the adoption of the standing rules, a quorum is established by the 
presence of a majority of those listed on the roll of members-elect prepared by 
the clerk of the preceding Congress pursuant to 2 U.S.C. § 26 (1997). The 
clerk does not include on that roll a member-elect who is deceased. After a 
quorum of members-elect is established, a speaker is elected. Once sworn, the 
speaker administers the oath to members-elect. At that point a quorum is a 
majority of those so sworn. Officers are then elected, and rules are adopted. 
At that point a quorum is a majority of those living and sworn or such other 
number as the rules might specify for a particular purpose. Therefore, a vote 
of as few as two out of three living and sworn members could enact the rules 
governing the House in a new Congress. 
12 In the event that not even three House members were alive or not 
incapacitated, martial law could be imposed with its consequent administration 
either ratified or rejected by a functional Congress that is subsequently 
composed. According to one historian: 
That martial law was not always considered oppressive is shown by 
the fact that citizens sometimes petitioned for it. Some 
Philadelphians, for instance, requested the President to declare 
martial law in their city at the time of [Confederate General Robert 
E.] Lee’s invasion to enable them to put the city in a proper state of 
defense. Nor should we suppose that the existence of martial law 
necessarily involved a condition of extensive or continuous military 
restraint. Beginning with September, 1863, the District of Columbia 
was subjected to martial law, and this state of affairs continued 
throughout the war, but it should not be supposed that residents of the 
capital city were usually conscious of serious curtailment of their 
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Such legislation could provide for the quick, temporary filling 
of House member seats in emergencies by, for example, 
providing that vacant House seats could be filled by an “election” 
with a very limited franchise in which only the governor and the 
highest-ranking member of each house of each state legislature 
may vote.13 Because the electorate in such an election would 
                                                          
liberties. The condition of martial law was here used as a means of 
military security. That martial law should be declared in areas of 
actual military operations was, of course, not remarkable. 
See JAMES G. RANDALL, CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS UNDER LINCOLN 170 
(Univ. of Ill. Press 1964) (rev. ed.). 
 In fulfilling constitutional responsibilities to put down insurrection, 
rebellion, or invasion, the president may resort to invoking martial law. His 
action, in this regard, is subject to judicial review. See, e.g., Ex parte 
Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 142 (1866) (“MARTIAL LAW PROPER . . . is called 
into action by Congress, or temporarily, when the action of Congress cannot 
be invited, and in the case of justifying or excusing peril, by the President, in 
times of insurrection or invasion, or of civil or foreign war, within districts or 
localities where ordinary law no longer adequately secures public safety and 
private rights.”); Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378, 402-03 (1932). The 
president may also exercise certain authority to create a condition similar to, 
but not actually one of, martial law: 
[In the event] the President considers that unlawful obstructions, 
combinations, or assemblages, or rebellion against the authority of 
the United States make it impracticable to enforce the laws of the 
United States in any State or Territory by the ordinary course of 
judicial proceedings, he may call into Federal service such of the 
militia of any State, and use such of the armed forces, as he considers 
necessary to enforce those laws or to suppress the rebellion.  
10 U.S.C. § 332 (1998). 
13 The legislation outlined here could take the following form: 
Section 1. If at any time one-quarter of the Members of the House of 
Representatives are unable to carry out their duties because of death 
or incapacity, the highest ranking executive officer and the highest 
ranking members of each branch of the legislature of a State 
represented by a Member who has died or become incapacitated may 
elect an otherwise qualified individual to take the place of the 
Member as soon as practicable but in no event later than seven days 
after the member’s death or incapacity has been certified by the 
President. 
Section 2. An individual elected to take the place of a Member of the 
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consist of only three people, it could be conducted quickly. 
Indeed, Alexander Hamilton, in Federalist No. 59, foresaw 
the need for the national legislature—Congress—to have the 
constitutional authority to preserve itself in times of crisis. When 
discussing Article I, Section 4, Clause 1, Hamilton wrote that “I 
am greatly mistaken . . . if there be any article in the whole plan 
[of the Constitution] more completely defensible than this. Its 
propriety rests upon the evidence of this plain proposition, that 
every government ought to contain in itself the means of its own 
preservation.”14 Failure to recognize such a principle in the 
Federal Constitution, Hamilton wrote, would constitute 
“imperfection in the system which may prove the seed of future 
weakness, and perhaps anarchy.”15 Hamilton continued that 
“[members of the Constitutional Convention] have submitted the 
regulation of elections for the federal government, in the first 
instance, to the local administrations; [but] they have reserved to 
the national authority a right to interpose, whenever 
extraordinary circumstances might render that interposition 
necessary to its safety.”16 
Congress cannot indefinitely suspend elections open to a 
larger electorate, as Article I, Section 3 of the Constitution 
requires that “[w]hen vacancies happen in the Representation 
                                                          
House of Representatives under Section 1 shall be treated as a 
Member of the House of Representatives and may serve until a 
Member is elected pursuant to a writ of election to fill the vacancy 
resulting from the death or incapacity. 
 This or similar legislation could further specify that the person chosen to 
fill a vacant House seat be a member of the same political party as its former 
occupant. Providing for the filling of vacant House seats with reference to 
political parties by statute also has the advantage of keeping out of the 
Constitution a reference to political parties. The Constitution currently 
contains no mention of political parties. 
14 THE FEDERALIST NO. 59, at 362 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton 
Rossiter ed., 1961). 
15 Id. 
16 Id. Article 1, Section 4, Clause 1 also gives state legislatures the 
authority to pass legislation so providing that vacant House seats representing 
their state be filled temporarily, which Congress may or may not supercede by 
law. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1. 
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from any State, the Executive authority thereof shall issue Writs 
of Election to fill such Vacancies.”17 However, a requirement 
that writs of election—which simply require that there be an 
election of some sort—must issue following a vacancy does not in 
itself deny Congress the authority to provide for the election, by 
a very limited electorate of state political leaders, of members to 
temporarily fill House vacancies in certain emergency situations. 
II. THE CONSTITUTION’S VOTING RIGHTS PROVISIONS 
Legislation providing for the election of members to 
temporarily fill House vacancies would also not violate the 
Constitution’s voting provisions. The Constitution prohibits 
certain discriminatory barriers to the right to vote, such as those 
based on race,18 sex,19 poll taxes,20 or age over 18 years,21 when 
such a right is extended. It does not guarantee, however, the 
right to vote per se.22 It follows that Congress could pass a law 
limiting the franchise to certain state political leaders who could 
fill vacant House seats temporarily as long as access to those 
positions of political leadership were not impeded by 
discriminatory barriers based on race, sex, or age over eighteen. 
Also, a unanimous Supreme Court, in Rodriguez v. Popular 
                                                          
17 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3. 
18 See U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1. 
19 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIX. 
20 See U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV, § 1. 
21 See U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI, § 1. 
22 See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 36 n. 78 
(1973). 
Since the right to vote, per se, is not a constitutionally protected 
right[,] references to that right are simply shorthand references to the 
protected right, implicit in our constitutional system, to participate in 
state elections on an equal basis with other qualified voters whenever 
the State has adopted an elective process for determining who will 
represent any segment of the State’s population. 
Id. See also Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162, 178 (1874) (“[T]he 
Constitution of the United States does not confer the right of suffrage upon 
any one.”). 
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Democratic Party,23 held that Puerto Rico statutes that vested in a 
single political party the initial authority to appoint interim 
replacements for vacancies in the Puerto Rico legislature until the 
next regularly scheduled general election do not violate the 
Federal Constitution, including its Equal Protection Clause. 
Those challenging the statutes claimed that “qualified voters have 
a federal constitutional right to elect their representatives to the 
Puerto Rico Legislature, and that vacancies in legislative offices 
therefore must be filled by a special election open to all qualified 
electors” and that because such vacancies were not so filled, 
other “qualified voters” were denied “equal protection.”24 The 
Supreme Court rejected both these arguments: 
[T]he Puerto Rico statute at issue here does not restrict 
access to the electoral process or afford unequal treatment 
to different classes of voters or political parties. All 
qualified voters have an equal opportunity to select a 
district representative in the general election; and the 
interim appointment provision applies uniformly to all 
legislative vacancies, whenever they arise . . . . 
Obviously, a statute designed to deal with the occasional 
problem of legislative vacancies will affect only those 
districts in which vacancies actually arise. However, such 
a statute is not for this reason rendered invalid under 
equal protection principles. A vacancy in the legislature is 
an unexpected, unpredictable event, and a statute 
providing that all such vacancies be filled by appointment 
does not have a special impact on any discrete group of 
voters or candidates.25 
Neither does Article I, Section 2, Clause 1 of the Constitution 
require that elections, other than regularly held general elections, 
be open to an electorate sharing the same qualifications as those 
requisite for electors of “the most numerous Branch of the State 
                                                          
23 457 U.S. 1, 8 (1982) (stating that “it is clear that the voting rights of 
Puerto Rico citizens are constitutionally protected to the same extent as those 
of all other citizens of the United States”). 
24 Id. at 7. 
25 Id. at 10 n.10. 
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Legislature.”26 That provision of the Constitution only requires 
that the “Electors in each State shall have the Qualifications 
requisite for electors of the most numerous Branch of the State 
Legislature” during elections for the House of Representatives 
conducted “every second year,” namely in general elections 
regularly held, not special elections to fill vacancies until the next 
general election.27 
                                                          
26 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1. 
27 Article I, Section 2, Clause 1 provides in full that “The House of 
Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen every second Year by 
the People of the several States, and the Electors in each State shall have the 
Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State 
Legislature.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2. While there is some ambiguity 
regarding whether this qualifications clause applies only to general elections or 
to both general and special elections, if the latter is the case, state legislatures 
should be able to enact provisions for temporarily filling vacant House seats 
when, for example, the member’s death or incapacity has been certified by the 
governor. Such a law would simply declare that during a specified emergency 
situation, the electors of the most numerous branch of the state legislature 
would consist of only the governor and the highest-ranking member of each 
house of the state legislature. 
 It may be argued that Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides 
for a reduction in a state’s representatives in proportion to a state’s 
disenfranchisement of its male citizens over the age of twenty-one. Section 2 
of the Fourteenth Amendment provides as follows: 
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States 
according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of 
persons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right 
to vote at any election for the choice of Electors for . . . 
Representatives in Congress . . . is denied to any of the male 
inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens 
of the United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation 
in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation therein shall 
be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male citizens 
shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of 
age in such State. 
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2. 
 This provision, however, has never been enforced, and it is unclear 
whether it would apply to only temporary reductions in the franchise triggered 
by emergency circumstances. 
TAYLORMACRO4-22.DOC 7/16/02 2:07 PM 
 EMERGENCY FILLING OF CONGRESSIONAL SEATS 385 
III. CONGRESS’S AUTHORITY TO “ALTER” STATE REGULATIONS 
GOVERNING FEDERAL ELECTIONS 
In arguing for the repeal of the clause in Article 1, Section 4 
of our Constitution that gives Congress the authority “to alter” 
election laws enacted by state legislatures, Congressman 
Saunders argued in 1911 that “no one has ever been able to 
ascertain the extent of the power conferred by the present 
language [of the Constitution] upon the Congress of the United 
States.”28 That statement remains true today, and Congress’ 
authority “to alter” election laws by providing for the temporary 
appointment of congressmen to fill vacant House seats is unclear. 
However, if through some terrible tragedy the vast majority of 
House members’ seats were left vacant, there is further authority 
for the proposition that Congress could by statute provide for 
temporary appointments—rather than elections by a restricted 
electorate—to fill vacant House seats. While some may argue that 
Congress’ power to “make or alter” regulations regarding the 
“election” of House members does not include the power to 
dispense with an election altogether, such an argument rests on 
the definition of the word “alter,” one modern definition of 
which today is “to make different without changing into 
something else.”29 However, the framers of the Constitution were 
not likely to have recognized the definition of “alter” to include 
something as subtle as “to make different without changing into 
something else.” The definition of “to alter” in A Dictionary of 
the English Language by Samuel Johnson, published in 1797 and 
on its eleventh edition at that time, is “[t]o change; to make 
otherwise than it is.”30 
                                                          
28 47 CONG. REC. 233 (1911) (remarks of Mr. Saunders). 
29 WEBSTER’S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (9th ed. 1991) 
(emphasis added). 
30 A catalog entry from Thomas Jefferson’s library shows that Johnson’s 
English Dictionary was part of Jefferson’s personal collection. See THOMAS 
JEFFERSON’S LIBRARY: A CATALOG WITH THE ENTRIES IN HIS OWN ORDER 
(James Gilreath & Douglas L. Wilson eds., 1989) (emphasis added). 
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CONCLUSION 
While it has become a sort of popular wisdom that the quick, 
temporary filling of House member seats in emergencies can be 
provided for only through a constitutional amendment, there is 
independent authority in the Constitution authorizing Congress, 
by statute, to do just that, if necessary, following a dire 
emergency. Neither the intent behind the Seventeenth 
Amendment, nor the Constitution’s voting rights provisions, 
prohibit Congress’ exercise of its authority under Article I, 
Section 4, Clause 1 to provide for the temporary filling of vacant 
House seats either through elections by a limited electorate or 
possibly by appointment. 
 
